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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
~lOSES If. HARRIS, 
Defendam.t and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS 
Appeals No. 
8065 
We agree with appellant's staterrwnt of facts but de-
sire to add one small note. The trial of this cause follow-
ed the procedure outlined and sanctioned by this court 
in the case of State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d 
383. Appellant was first convicted of the crime of driving 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor under an information containing two counts. The 
first count charged him with the substantive offense and 
the second with having been previously convicted of the 
same offense. After a verdict of guilty was returned un-
der the first count, the second portion of the information 
was read and trial was had upon this issue. The jury re-
turned a verdict of guilty of having been previously con-
victed of the same offense. 
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STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT THAT APPELLANT HAD BEEN CONVICTED OF. 
THE PRIOR OFFENSE OF DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE ADMISSION OF A 
CERTIFIED COPY OF THE MINUTE ENTRYS AND JUDG-
MENT OF AN ALLEGED PRIOR CONVICTION OF APPEL-
LANT IN LOGAN CITY COURT. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT DIRECT A VERDICT IN ITS 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ISSUE OF PRIOR CONVICTION. 
IF THE INSTRUCTION WAS ERRONEOUS; NEVERTHE-
LESS APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED. 
POINT IV. 
IN THE EVENT THE JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE 
JURY'S VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF A; 
PRIOR CONVICTION IS REVERSED, A NEW TRIAL 
SHOULD BE GRANTED ONLY AS TO THAT PART OF THE 
CHARGE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT THAT APPELLANT HAD BEEN CONVICTED OF 
THE PRIOR OFFENSE OF DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE ADMISSION OF A 
CERTIFIED COPY OF THE MINUTE ENTRYS AND JUDG-
MENT OF AN ALLEGED PRIOR CONVICTION OF APPEL-
LANT IN LOGAN CITY COURT. 
Since Points I and II are intertwined and appellant 
has considered the1n together in his brief, we shall do 
the same. On the issue of identity appellant cites State v. 
Bruno, 69 Utah -!:44, 256 P. 109, for the proposition that 
identity is an element to be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. He then cornplains of the absence of any evidence 
showing the two defendants to be the smne and asserts 
that this question should not have gone to the jury. We 
have no quarrel with the reasonable doubt rule for it is 
elementary. The rnatter of identity however is something 
lying entirely within the province of the jury to decide 
and thus it should be subn1itted to them. The Bruno 
case cites State v. A.ime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704, for the 
principle that the issue of identity should be submitted to 
the jury. In both of those cases as in the one at bar there 
was no evidence other than the record itself on the ques-
tion of identity and the defendant in testifying did not 
deny that he was the person formerly convicted. The 
Aime conviction was affirmed on the grounds that the is-
sue was put to the jury. r~rhe Bruno conviction was set 
aside because the court perernptorily instructed the jury 
that the records of the City Court were to be taken as 
prima facie evidence of the fact that the defendant was 
formerly convicted, thus charging them that as a matter 
of law that fact was established. 
') 
,_) 
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Therefore, the only question here to be resolYt>d is 
whether the question of identity was properly put to the 
jury. The charge is set out in appellant's brief on pp. 4-5 
so we shall not set it out here. We call attention however 
to the fact that the court specifically charges the jury 
with the duty, on the evidence before them, of finding that 
appellant was charged, entered a plea of guilty and sen-
tence pronounced in order to find that he was previously 
convicted. Counsel for appellant stated further that they 
should find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was con-
victed in the City Court of the crime of drunken driving. 
The court adopted this. 
It is true that the City Court prosecution was against 
a "l\Iose Harris". However, in the trial of the substan-
tive offense it is to be noted that the appellant was re-
peatedly referred to as "Mose" by his own witnesses 
(Tr. 57, 58, 60, 63, 70). It is apparent also that appellant 
had lived in the valley for a number of years and was 
well known, and further, that the conviction was had 
in the precinct of appellant's residence. lie made no 
proper objection to the reception of the certified copy, 
offered no evidence, made no request for instruction or an 
e"ception to a failure to instruct and made no argument 
on this question, a matter clearly within his own knowl-
edge. This case in this respect seems to fall within the 
rule laid down by State v. A ime, supra, where it was 
held: 
But the verdict in this case does not rest upon 
the bare proof of identity of name. There was 
the additional circu1nstance that the previous con-
viction wa:s had in the precinct of defendant's resi-
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dence, and the more ~i5.~·nlficun t fad that, although 
the defendant testified as a witness in his own be-
half, he did not deny that he was the person de-
scribed in the record of conviction previously 
introduced in evidence against hirn. While under 
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §9279, the neglect or re-
fusal of a defendant to be a witness cannot preju-
dice hirn or be used against hirn, when he volun-
tarily testified he is subject to the same rules as 
other witnesses, and his failure to deny a material 
fact within his knowledge previously testified to 
against hirn warrants the inference that it \vas 
true. State v. Mattivi, 39 Utah, 334, 117 Pac. 31. 
\Ve assert therefore that the question of identity was put 
to the jury, that they could find frorn the evidence that 
the appellant was formerly convicted and that their ver-
dict of guilty properly assumes that they believed appel-
lant to be the one previously convicted. 
Appellant in support of his attack upon the lower 
court's admission of a certified copy of minute entries 
and judgrnent showing an alleged prior conviction in 
Logan City Court, relies upon the case of State v. Flor-
ence, 79 Utah 200, 8 P. 2d 621. The Florence case perhaps 
recited the rule insofar as mere docket entries were con-
cerned in view of the applicable statute as it then ex-
isted. That statute was Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §8844, 
and provided as follows: 
In pleading a judgnwnt or other determina-
tion of, or proceeding before, a court or officer of 
special jurisdiction, it shall not be necessary to 
state the facts constituting jurisdiction; but the 
judgrnent or deterrnination may be stated as give~ 
or made, or the proceedings had. rrhe facts consh-
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tuting jurisdiction, however, 1nust be established 
on the trial. 
This section carried over into R. S. U. 1933 verbatim, and 
appeared as 105-21-17. However, in 1935 the legislature 
completely re-wrote the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
Laws of Utah 1935, Ch. 118, and this section, there de-
nominated as 105-21-29, emerged as it now stands in 77-
21-29, U.C.A. 1953. It has a new and different meaning 
now, however. It provides as follows: 
(1) In referring in an information or indict-
ment to a judgment or other determination of, or 
a proceeding before, any court or official, civil or 
military, it is unnecessary to allege the facts con-
ferring jurisdiction on such court or official, hut 
it is sufficient to allege generally that such judg-
Inent or determination was given or made or such 
proceeding had, in such manner as identifies the 
judg1nent, determination or proceeding. 
(2) If the judgment was given by an officer 
exercising special jurisdiction or by a court other 
than a court of record the facts constituting juris-
diction must be established on the trial. 
Thus the legislature has since seen fit to impose the rule 
laid down in the F'lorence case only on judgments given 
by officers exercising special jurisdiction or courts other 
than courts of record. There is now no such requirement 
where courts of record are concerned. That city courts 
are courts of record is set out in 78-1-1 and 78-1-2, U.C.A. 
1953, which provide as follows: 
78-1-l. The following- are the courts of justice 
of this state : 
(1) 'l1he senate sitting as court of impeach-
n1ent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(:2) rl'he Supreme Court. 
( 3) The district courts. 
(·l) rrhe city rourts. 
( 5) The juvenile courts. 
(6) Justices' courts. ' -~-..:.. ............. ..a.--
78-1-2. r.rhe courts enu1nerated in the first;~ 
subdivisions of the preceding section are courts 
of record. 
Clearly then, the case of State v. Florence is not in point 
and the certified copy was properly received in evidence. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT DIRECT A VERDICT IN ITS 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ISSUE OF PRIOR CONVICTION. 
IF THE INSTRUCTION WAS ERRONEOUS; NEVERTHE-
LESS APPELLANT \VAS NOT PREJUDICED. 
Appellant relies on the holding in State v. Bruno, 
supra, as authority for striking down the instruction 
here given, asserting that it directs a verdict. The 
instruction in that case was as follows: 
In this case the records of the city court of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, before Noel S. Pratt, city 
judge, and ex officio justice of the peace, have 
been received in evidence; that said records show 
that on or about the 3rd day of September, 1924, 
the defendant was found guilty of having intoxi-
cating liquor in her possession, so that you are to 
take that as prima facie evidence of the fact in 
the case. 
There is a material difference between that instruction 
and the one given here. As recited before, the Bruno 
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instruction peremptorily instructed the jury that the 
records of the City Court were to be taken by them as 
prima facie evidence of the fact of conviction. In the 
instant case the court's pronounce1nenta were permissive 
in nature, still leaving the detern1ination of the fact to 
the jury. While the charge might properly have been 
framed in a different manner, it can be struck down onlv 
on a showing that a substantial right of the defendant 
has been affected. There is in fact a presumption that 
error shall not be deemed to have resulted in prejudice. 
This is contained in 77-32-1, U.C.A. 1953, as follows: 
Alter hearing an appeal the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or defects 
which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. If error has been cominitted, it shall not 
be presuined to have resulted in prejudice. rrhe 
court Inust be satisfied that it has that effeet 
before it is warranted in reversing the judgment. 
The case of State v. Cluff, 48 Utah 102, 158 P. 701, con-
tains an extensive discussion of error resulting in preju-
dice. There the trial court's ruling indulging improper 
cross e~amina tion was complained of. This court through 
Straup C. J., held that son1e con1mitted errors, prima 
facie, are not calculated to do harm, and hence no 
presumption of harn1ful effect is to be indulged, but 
that the party affected may, by the record, show that 
the ruling resulted in prejudice of s01ne substantial right. 
On the other hand, error may be conunitted which, prima 
facie, is calculated to prejudice some substantial right. 
Prejudice will then be presun1ed until, by the record, it 
IS shown that it did not or could not have prejudiced a 
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substantial right. The court there affirmed the con-
viction on the ground that though prejudice should be 
presumed from the error there con1mitted; nevertheless, 
the record disclosed no violation of a substantial right 
in the face of the undisputed evidence of guilt. The 
court said: 
Upon this evidence we do not say that the 
defendant is guilty, or that he ought to have been 
convicted. It is not within our province to decide 
that or to detennine his guilt or innocence. But 
because of the undisputed evidence, and the un-
denied admissions of the defendant, we are satis-
fied that the same result would have been reached 
by the jury had not the i1nproper cross-examina-
tion and argu1nent been per1nitted, and hence that 
the verdict was not influenced thereby. It may 
be asked, How do we know that 1 We know it 
hy attributing to the ;jury the common sense and 
experience possessed by the a'-.rerage juror who, 
mindful of his duty as a juror and considering the 
evidence dispassionately, could not well have 
rendered a verdict of not guilty without disre-
garding the undisputed evidence and undenied 
admissions of the defendant as to his guilt. 
\Ve sub1nit that in the instant case, confronted only by 
the record of conviction, the jury could not well have 
rendered a verdict of not guilty without disregarding 
the undisputed evidence before them. Thus the same 
result would have been reached in the absence of the 
statement by the court, and hence the verdict was not 
influenced thereby. 
It is law too elemental for citation of authority that 
instructions are to be considered as a whole and 1nay 
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not be picked apart anJ portions of . then1 assigned as 
error. If the charge overall is fair, it rnust stand. The 
instruction in the instant case as a whole was fair and 
left it to the jury to determine guilt or innocence. 
POINT IV. 
IN THE EVENT THE JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE 
JURY'S VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF A 
PRIOR CONVICTION IS REVERSED, A NEW TRIAL 
SHOULD BE GRANTED ONLY AS TO THAT PART OF THE 
CHARGE. 
In the event the judgn1ent based upon the prior con-
viction is reversed, the whole matter should not be sent 
back for a new trial. Appellant would be entitled to a 
new trial only .. on the issue of having been previously 
convicted. The substantive conviction should stand. rrhis 
must be so frorn the very nature of the proceeding. In 
such a case as this a defendant is tried first on the sub-
stantive offense. No issue of prior conviction is injected 
into this trial. It is not an element of the substantive 
offense. Until a verdict is rendered on the principal 
issue, there is no occasion to mention the prior conviction 
because the previous offense would not be competent to 
prove the defendant cornn1itted the offense for which he 
is then on trial. Thus it differs fron1 the case of a per-
sistent violator charge \vhere the previous conviction is 
an elernent. State v. Stewart, supra. If a verdict of 
guilty is returned, the second count in the information is 
then read and the trial proceeds solely on the issue of a 
prior conviction in front of the san1e jury. Therefore, 
any error cornmitted in the trial of this second issue 
10 
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would not relate at all to the conviction on the sub-
stantive offense. 
CONCLUSION 
We sub1nit that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the verdict of prior conviction; that the court did 
not err in ad1nitting the certified copy of the City Court 
records and that the court did not direct a verdict in its 
instructions on the issue of prior conviction, and 
further that if the instruction was erroneous, neverthe-
less appellant was not prejudiced. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
RICHARD L. STINE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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